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Justices may settle admissibility of-lie detector tests once and for all
BY RICHARD C. REUBEN
In an age of technological mira-
cles, a court case involving the va-
lidity of lie detector tests seems al-
most anachronistic.
Refusing to admit lie detector
test results into evidence is a time-
honored tradition in U.S. courts. In
fact, it was just such a disputed test
that gave rise to the longstanding
rule on admissibility of scientific
evidence expressed 74 years ago in
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013.
Under the Frye test, which still
is widely followed, scientific evidence
may be admitted if it is based on
principles "sufficiently established to
have general acceptance in the field
to which it belongs."
While the technical sophistica-
tion of today's polygraphs is far be-
yond the cathode-tube stuff of the
1920s, many lawyers and judges
continue to view them as inherent-
ly unreliable and overly prejudicial.
Their concern is that the procedure
does not test whether a subject is
telling the truth but measures
physiological responses to ques-
tions-which may reveal much, but
not necessarily the truth.
But this fall, the U.S. Supreme
Court will consider, in United States
v. Scheffer, No. 96-1133, whether to
finally lift the barrier to admissibil-
ity of polygraph evidence, at least in
the federal courts, on grounds that
it inhibits the constitutional right
of criminal defendants to present
their defenses.
The Court might see an easier
path toward admissibility in light of
its 1993 decision in Daubert v. Mer-
rill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S.
5795. There, the justices rejected
Frye's "general acceptance" test for
admissibility with a relevancy analy-
sis contained in Rule 702 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. The rule al-
lows "opinion testimony" by a
"qualified person" concerning "scien-
tific, technical or other specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue."
By introducing a new standard
for admitting scientific evidence,
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Daubert has made a judicial return
to the seminal question of lie detec-
tors seem inevitable.
Several federal courts already
have taken up the question. Some,
such as the 6th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals based in Cincinnati,
have remained generally faithful to
Frye by continuing to reject poly-
graph test results. Most of the cir-
cuits considering the question have
by now allowed, the admission of
test results under Daubert, but
some still are operating under Frye-
based precedents that have yet to
be challenged under Daubert.
It is this split that the Court is
expected to mend when it hears ar-
guments early in the 1997-98 term,
which opens Oct. 6.
Testing the Right to a Defense
Scheffer, however, comes not
out of any of the circuits but out of
the U.S. Court of Military Appeals.
The evidence issue is raised under
Military Rule of Evidence 707 rather
than Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
But that is expected to be a distinc-
tion without a difference, since the
two sets of rules are similar.
Edward G. Scheffer, an enlisted
man in the Air Force, was court-mar-
tialed for kiting bad checks, using
methamphetamines, failing to go to
his appointed place of duty and going
absent without leave for 13 days.
In defending the drug charges,
Scheffer wanted to introduce favor-
able results of a polygraph test re-
quested by the Air Force during its
investigation.
A military trial judge, applying
the Frye test, refused Scheffer's re-
quest. He appealed, contending that
the absolute bar on the admissibili-
ty of polygraph evidence contained
in Rule 707 of the Military Rules of
Evidence violated his constitutional
right under the Sixth Amendment
to present a defense to his criminal
prosecution.
The Court of Military Appeals
agreed, removing the bar on per se
inadmissibility of polygraph test re-
sults."Foundation evidence for prof-
fered polygraph evidence must es-
tablish that the underlying theory
that a deceptive answer will produce
a measurable physiological response
is scientifically valid," the court held.
"This foundation must include
evidence that the examiner is qual-
ified, that the equipment worked
properly and was properly used,
and that the examiner used valid
questioning techniques."
As usual, the justices have
many options open to them in de-
ciding Scheffer. But given Daubert,
they finally may decide to give lie
detectors their day in court. U
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